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ABSTRACT 
 
Whilst choice experiments (CEs) are widely applied in economics to study choice behaviour, 
understanding of how individuals’ process attribute information remains limited. We show how eye-
tracking methods can provide insight into how decisions are made. Participants completed a CE while 
their eye movements were recorded. Results show that while the information presented guided 
participants’ decisions, there were also several processing biases at work. Evidence was found of (i) 
top-to-bottom, (ii) left-to-right and (iii) first-to-last order biases. Experimental factors - whether 
attributes are defined as ‘best’ or ‘worst’, choice task complexity and attribute ordering - also influence 
information processing. How individuals visually process attribute information was shown to be related 
to their choices. Implications for the design and analysis of CEs and future research are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of Choice Experiments (CEs) to value non-marketed 
commodities (Clark et al, 2014; de Bekker-Grob et al, 2012). Modelling CE responses typically rests 
on the assumption of utility maximisation (Manski, 1977). However, it is well documented in the 
decision making literature that humans deviate from such choice behaviour. Decision-making has been 
shown to be affected by factors such as number of alternatives, number of attributes, time pressure, and 
similarity between alternatives, as well as the decision environment and person characteristics 
(DeShazo & Fermo, 2002; Day et al, 2012; Day & Pinto Prades, 2010; Gigerenzer & Todd, 2001). For 
example, studies asking participants to verbally express their reasoning processes while making 
decisions demonstrate that individuals behave as “cognitive misers”, adapting effort invested in making 
a decision to context and resources (Shugan, 1980; Payne et al, 1993). 
 
Methods to investigate how participants make multi-attribute choices in applied economics are limited. 
Early research tested for lexicographic preferences (e.g., do respondents always choose the cheapest 
option?) (Saelensminde, 2006; Rosenberger et al, 2003; McIntosh & Ryan, 2002). However, 
lexicographic preference structures may be consistent with trading, indicating strong preferences rather 
than violation of the continuity axiom. Research then tried a range of other approaches. For example, 
Ryan et al (2009) attempted to probe into underlying decision processes by using “think aloud” methods 
where participants are asked to vocalize their ongoing decision processes. Whilst finding evidence that 
‘irrational’ responses can be rationalised, respondents struggled to think aloud. Another strategy 
involves determining what makes people ignore information (attribute non-attendance, ANA), either by 
asking participants to state which attributes they consider when making their choices (Scarpa et al, 
2013; Hole et al, 2013), or by inferring ANA from their choices (Hole 2011; Campbell et al, 2011; 
McNair et al, 2012). However, these two approaches suffer from limitations. While the stated ANA 
approach is limited by participants’ ability to recall how they reached their decisions (or to critically 
reflect on how they make their decisions), inferred ANA relies on questionable statistical considerations 
and provides no understanding of why an attribute is ignored (Hess et al, 2013; Hensher et al, 2013). 
 
Recently, it has been suggested that eye-tracking may provide a powerful tool for better understanding 
economic behaviour (Lahey & Oxley, 2016). A limited but growing number of studies have explored 
the role of visual attention in economic decision making (Caplin & Dean, 2008; Knoepfle et al, 2009; 
Wang et al, 2010; Reutskaja et al, 2011). In the CE literature, a small number of studies have used eye-
tracking to improve the modelling of responses, with a focus on attribute non-attendance (Balcombe et 
al, 2015; Krucien et al, 2017; Van Loo et al, 2015; Uggeldahl et al, 2016; Meiβner et al, 2016; Spinks 
& Mortimer, 2015). Our novel work extends this literature, exploring how eye-tracking can be used to 
better understand how respondents interact with the choice tasks and process multi-attribute information 
in CEs. 
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Section 2 describes the design of the experiment, while Sections 3 and 4 describe how we link eye 
movements to choice processes, using fixation times (the total time spent on a piece of information) 
(Section 3) and fixation transitions (how often the eye shifts from one piece of information to another) 
(Section 4). Section 5 investigates the link between eye movements and choice behaviour. Across all 
analyses, we consistently find that information processing is subject to biases (in the order in which 
information is processed) and experimental factors (whether attributes defined as best or worse, 
difficultly of task and order of attributes). We also demonstrate that choices can be better modelled 
when eye-tracking data is incorporated, meaning that eye movement information explains people’s 
choices beyond what information is presented to the participants. The results have important 
implications for the design and analysis of CEs, which will be discussed. Section 6 discusses limitations 
of our study, identifying important areas for future research. Section 7 offers concluding comments.  
 
 
2. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT  
2.1 Choice experiment  
Participants’ choices were recorded for an existing CE on preferences for health & lifestyle (H&L) 
programmes to reduce obesity (Ryan et al, 2015). Each programme was described by seven attributes 
(Table 1). Participants were presented with 14 choice tasks: two warm up (non-experiment) tasks (#1 
and #2), and 10 experimental tasks intermixed with a monotonicity and stability check. The warm-up 
tasks, used to familiarise participants with the format of the choice tasks, were dropped for the eye-
tracking analyses. Participants were asked to select their preferred option among two generic H&L 
programmes (i.e., Programme A vs. B) and an opt-out (“Current situation”) option (Figure 1). The order 
of the tasks was randomised across participants. Choice tasks were presented on a computer screen. No 
time limit was imposed. 
 
2.2 Experimental manipulation 
Participants were allocated to one of two experimental conditions. In the initial experiment (Experiment 
1, N=28), attributes were presented (from top to bottom) in the following order: PROGRAMME, 
WEIGHT, GOAL, DIABETES, HBP, TIME, and COST. In the second experiment (Experiment 2, 
N=30), the order of the attributes was reversed (i.e., COST; TIME; …; WEIGHT; PROGRAMME) and 
the location of the choices was switched (Left ↔ Right). The experiments were otherwise identical. 
 
 
2.3 Eye tracking 
The CE was completed in a dedicated eye-tracking laboratory and eye movements were recorded using 
an eye tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research). The eye tracker was calibrated for each participant using 
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the system’s default nine-point procedure. To avoid large head movements we used a combined head-
and-chin rest. The data were divided into fixations (i.e., periods where the eyes remain relatively still) 
and saccades (i.e., fast eyes’ movements during which information processing is suppressed). In line 
with the eye movement literature, we assume that information extraction only took place during the 
fixations and that a minimum of 50 milliseconds (ms) was needed for meaningful extraction of 
information (Tatler et al, 2006). Fixations were analysed in terms of where they were directed to with 
respect to 24 regions of interest (ROI) (Figure 1). 
 
The initial dataset included 37,784 fixations, recorded from 58 participants responding to 12 choices. 
After excluding fixations of less than 50 ms, 36,862 fixations remained: fixations on the column labels 
(4.6%); fixations on the multi-attribute content of the two options (84.7%); fixations on the descriptive 
column (7.6%); and fixations on blank space (3.1%). We further excluded fixations on column labels 
and blank space, resulting in 34,023 observations for analysis. 
 
2.4 Participants 
The 58 participants were students or former students from the University of Aberdeen (UK) recruited 
using online advertisement on a first-come-first-served basis. They took part in return for course credit 
or participated without reimbursement. The first 28 participants were allocated to Experiment 1 and the 
following 30 participants to Experiment 2. The study was approved by the local ethics committee.  
 
The two samples did not differ in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Males made up 52% of 
the sample (13/25) in Experiment 1 and 31% (9/29) in Experiment 2 (χ2 = 1.653; P = 0.198). Information 
about height and weights was used to compute the body mass index (BMI) - 72% (18/25) of participants 
had a normal BMI in  Experiment 1 versus 69% in Experiment 2 (20/29) (χ2 < 0.001; P > 0.999). The 
two samples were also similar in terms of age, with a mean age of 20.83 (SD = 1.73) and 20.48 (SD = 
2.33) for Experiments 1 and 2 respectively (t = 0.614; P = 0.542).  
 
 
3. DETERMINANTS OF FIXATION TIMES 
A range of measures have been developed to analyse visual attention (e.g., fixation time, fixation 
frequency/count, pupil dilation) (Duchowski, 2007; Holmqvist, 2011). We focus on the total fixation 
time (FT) on each ROI, previously used as a measure of information interest and difficulty (Rayner, 
1998). To avoid strong effects of long fixations on a piece of evidence, and to reduce the skew of the 
distribution, we used the natural logarithm of FT, which was computed for each ROI (see Figure 1) at 
the participant by task level. Using mixed effects linear models, we investigate the extent to which 
ln(FT) is influenced by the following CE  factors: 
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• The LEFT parameter (β1) captures the systematic effect of a ROI belonging to the left 
alternative compared to the right. Such an effect would be consistent with a “left-to-right” 
reading bias where participants pay more attention to information presented on the left (Rayner 
1978, 1998; Guo et al, 2009; Durgin et al, 2008). Leftward biases are also found in other tasks, 
including digit comparison (Loetscher et al, 2008), picture scanning and line bisection 
(Foulsham et al, 2010), visual search (Durgin et al, 2008), reading Chinese characters and face 
perception (Butler et al, 2005; Everdell et al, 2007; van Belle et al, 2010). We expect 
participants to spend more time looking at the left options (H1: β1 > 0).  
 
• Two POSITION parameters capture the effects of the attributes position within the choice tasks. 
(β2) and (β3) measure respectively the effect of being top located (1st or 2nd position) and bottom 
located (6th or 7th position) versus being middle located (i.e., 3rd, 4th, or 5th position). This would 
also be consistent with typical reading patterns, and has been found in other domains such as 
visual search (Durgin et al, 2008). Within the CE literature there is evidence of ordering effects 
on estimated preferences (Kjær et al, 2006; Scott & Vick, 1999). Thus, first and last consulted 
pieces of information may receive a visual attention bonus-malus. We expect fixation times to 
differ for the top (H2[a]: β2 ≠ 0) and bottom located attributes (H2[b]: β3 ≠ 0). 
 
• The two LEVEL parameters (β4, β5) capture the effects of attributes’ value, either BEST or 
WORST, on visual attention. An attribute is classified as BEST when it is set at its most 
desirable level (e.g., lowest price) and WORST when set at least desirable level (e.g., highest 
price) (Table 1). We expect extreme information, either BEST or WORST, to be more 
psychologically salient (compared to INTERMEDIATE), thus attracting more attention 
(H3[a]: β4 > 0; H3[b]: β5 > 0). In line with loss aversion, participants are expected to be more 
sensitive to negatively framed information (Kahneman et al, 1991). We therefore expect 
participants to be more attentive to WORST than BEST information (H3[c]: β4 < β5). Our 
classification of attributes’ levels as BEST, INTERMEDIATE or WORST is based on results 
from Ryan et al (2015) which administered the same CE questionnaire to a representative 
sample of the UK population.  
 
• Two TRIAL parameters (β6, β7) capture the effect of task sequence (i.e., position of the choice 
tasks within the questionnaire). Previous studies have reported effects of task ordering on the 
consistency of respondents’ choices (Day et al, 2012; Mantonakis et al, 2009; Bateman et al, 
2008), suggesting learning and fatigue effects. We assume that as respondents progress through 
the choice tasks, they become more efficient in their information search, reducing fixation times 
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on the ROI (H4[a]: β6 < 0). However this effect is expected to become marginally smaller over 
the sequence of tasks (H4[b]: β7 > 0). 
 
• The DIFFICULTY parameter (β8) captures the impact of choice difficulty. Shugan (1980) 
argues that difficulty is inversely related to perceptual similarity - highly different options are 
more difficult. As alternatives become less similar, the variance in the values on the attributes 
across alternatives increases. This can be captured by the dispersion of the standard deviation 
(DSD) among attribute levels across alternatives (DeShazo & Fermo, 2002)1. A priori it is 
hypothesised that as DSD increases, choice sets become less similar, and participants spend 
more time processing the multi-attribute information (H5: β8 > 0).   
 
• The EXPERIMENT parameter (β9) captures the effect of reversing the order of attributes and 
two choice options (over and above LEFT and POSITION). Using brain imaging, Karmarkar 
et al (2015) found that different orderings of product features was associated with different 
decision rules/objectives i.e. when the product price was presented first, participants were more 
likely to focus on whether the product was worth its price. We expect fixation times to 
significantly differ across experiments (H6: β9 ≠ 0). 
 
We thus estimate: 
 ln(FTntr) = β0 + β1LEFTntr + β2:3POSITIONntr + β4:5LEVELntr + β6:7TRIALntr +
β8DIFFICULTYntr + β9EXPERIMENTntr +ωn + εntr   (2) 
 
Where (FTntr) indicates the fixation time on ROI (r) by respondent (n) at task (t). The errors (ω, ε) are 
assumed to be multivariate normally distributed and uncorrelated. Given that we use ln(FT) as the 
dependent variable, estimates can be interpreted as the % change in the fixation time by taking their 
exponent (i.e., exp(β)). 
 
Results are presented in Table 2. Attributes of the left option were fixated on average +16% longer than 
those of the right option, suggesting a left-to-right bias in visual attention, in agreement with studies in 
other domains (see above). Part of this bias may be the result of the reading direction (left-to-right) in 
                                                          
1 The entropy measure is often used to capture task difficulty in CEs, describing the similarity of alternatives. 
Entropy is typically constructed using participant responses, creating an endogeneity problem i.e. entropy is a 
function of the probability of selecting each of the available alternatives, and thus may be a consequence of fixation 
time (rather than vice versa). We thank the Reviewer for this comment and thus use the DSD measure (which does 
not rely on respondent preferences). Appendix 1 compares the results using Entropy and DSD measures, the main 
results remain unchanged.  
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our participants and an interesting future direction would therefore be to study whether this bias is 
reversed when using a language with right-to-left reading direction (e.g., Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew, and 
Urdu) This visual bias may explain why CEs often find a significant constant term in generic choices. 
This finding suggests randomising the order of the alternatives within the choice tasks may improve the 
quality of CE data.  
 
The first two attributes were looked at longer than the middle positioned attributes (+ 30%) whilst the 
bottom located attributes were looked at less (- 16%). These effects indicate a top-to-bottom visual bias 
when processing vertically presented (multi-attribute) information. Our finding suggests that observed 
top-to-bottom biases in CE may have their origin in stronger visual attention to attributes shown at the 
top. This suggests it is important to randomise the order of attributes. We suggest that this randomization 
is best done at the participant level (i.e., the order of the attributes would differ across participants but 
remains the same for all tasks faced by the same participant), because otherwise, participants have to 
adopt to a new order of attributes on every single choice. 
 
Negatively (WORST) framed attributes were less looked at (- 4%), while positively (BEST) framed 
attributes were associated with longer fixation times (+ 9%). The finding suggests respondents give 
relatively more consideration to attributes with positive outcomes, consistent with Dawes’ rule (Dawes, 
1979), where alternatives with the highest number of positive aspects are chosen more often. Note that 
this finding is inconsistent with loss aversion, which predicted that negatively framed attributes would 
be fixated for longer. A possible reason for failing to find evidence of loss aversion may be that we 
dealt with hypothetical (non-consequential) choices, and it would therefore be interesting to determine 
whether the same result is obtained for actual choices (e.g., people making decisions in a doctor’s 
surgery). Alternatively, future studies could examine whether one of the approaches to mitigate such 
hypothetical bias (e.g., cheap talk script, oath protocol) (Carlsson et al, 2005; Jacquemet et al, 2013; 
Özdemir et al, 2009) influences the bias towards positively frames attributes that we found here. 
 
Both TRIAL variables had a significant effect on fixation time. The significant and negative trial 
number effect indicates that as participants progress through the sequence of tasks they spend less time 
looking at the different ROIs (first-to-last bias). The quadratic effect indicates that the marginal change 
in fixation time decreases over time. This result suggests that first observed choices could be 
contaminated by participants adjusting to the task and respondents may change their choice 
behaviour(s) during the study. Such an interpretation would agree with findings showing significantly 
longer responses time for the 1st task (Borjesson & Fosgerau, 2015). The present results, because we 
used 2 warm-up trials, suggests that longer fixation times last beyond the first task. It is therefore 
important to randomise the order of choices across participants, so that in the average data, such effects 
can be minimized. 
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The DIFFICULTY (DSD) parameter describes a positive relationship between task difficulty and visual 
attention. Participants spend more time fixating attributes when facing difficult choice tasks. This result 
is important for the design of CEs. While on the one hand, one would like to maximize the information 
gained from each trial by making the choice tasks more challenging, it could, on the other hand, wear 
out participants. This is in line with suggestions that statistical efficiency (i.e., information gained from 
each choice) is negatively correlated with the respondents’ efficiency (i.e., the ability of participants to 
make informed decisions) (Viney et al, 2005; Flynn et al, 2016). Our study suggests that although 
increased statistical efficiency could wear participants out, it seems to improve respondents’ attention, 
possibly leading to more informed decisions. The question arises to when this positive benefit on 
attention breaks down (e.g., after how many trials), which could be an interesting topic for future 
research. 
 
The EXPERIMENT variable significantly contributed to the prediction of the fixation times. This 
means that the ordering of the attributes influenced fixation times beyond the effects of the attributes 
being left or right, or top or bottom. This suggests that besides considering what attributes to include 
(e.g., Coast et al, 2012), the design of CEs should also consider in what order the attributes are 
presented, particularly when computerised CEs are employed. When randomising is not an option (e.g., 
for pen-and-paper surveys), a second best solution may be to define “experientially meaningful 
configurations” (Hensher & Truong, 1985), which uses an ordering of attributes that is consistent with 
different steps in the process involved (e.g., for a medical appointment, the delay to get an appointment, 
the distance to travel, the waiting time, the length of consultation and out-of-pocket expense).  
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF FIXATION TRANSITIONS 
So far, we have only considered how long people look at attributes. This, however, discounts temporal 
information on the order in which attributes are processed. There are indications that the order of 
processing is important for decision making.  For example, Armel et al (2008) showed that first fixated 
product (option) was more likely to be selected ceteris paribus. Likewise, participants are more likely 
to choose the option they look at last (Shimojo et al, 2003).  To analyse order effects, we here examine 
transitions (i.e., eye-movements between ROI) as a function of time in the trials (percentage of the 
trials). We define four transition categories: option-wise (vertical reading) where participants move 
their eyes across ROI belonging to the same option (e.g., TIME [A] → COST [A]); attribute-wise 
(horizontal reading) where participants compare options on an attribute-by-attribute basis (e.g., COST 
[A] → COST [B]); refixations where participants consecutively fixate on the same ROI (e.g., COST 
[A] → COST [A]) and hybrid where participants move their eyes across ROI belonging to different 
options (e.g., TIME [A] → COST [B]). If people first form an overall impression of each choice option 
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and then compare these overall impressions, we expect more option-wise transitions. If they compare 
the attributes of the two choice options directly, we expect more attribute-wise transitions. 
 
Our dataset initially included 34,023 transitions. Those corresponding to a transition from the 
descriptive column (i.e. ROI 1 to 8 in Figure 1) were excluded, leaving 29,641 (87.1 %) transitions: 
13,548 (45.7 %) refixations; 8,645 (29.2 %) option-wise; 4,898 (16.5 %) attribute-wise; and 2,550 (8.6 
%) hybrid. (Detailed information about transitions is provided in Supplementary Material) Figure 2 
shows the time-course of transitions across choices, clustered into 10 time bins for each trial (i.e., 
beginning of the information processing period [0-10%]; …; end of information processing period [90-
100%]). Visual information processing mainly consists of refixations and option-wise transitions: 
participants initially (i.e., first three time bins) process the multi-attribute information mainly with 
refixations before exploring the content of each option separately (i.e., option-wise transitions). 
 
We investigate transitions as a function of three task-related variables: TRIAL (Task order); Dispersion 
of Standard deviation [DSD] (Task difficulty); and EXPERIMENT (Experiment 1 or 2). As the 
dependent measure, we use the Search Measure (SM) index (Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994), which 
measures the degree to which information is processed vertically or horizontally (see Appendix 2 for 
more details about the SM measure). SM is computed as:  
 
SM=
√TR�JKTR�TR𝐽𝐽−TR𝐾𝐾�−(𝐾𝐾−𝐽𝐽)�
�𝐽𝐽2(𝐾𝐾−1)+K2(𝐽𝐽−1)   (Eq. 3) 
 
Where (J) corresponds to the number of choice options (J=2), (K) the number of attributes (K=7), (TR) 
the total number of transitions, (TRK) the number of attribute-wise transition and (TRJ) the number of 
option-wise transitions. The SM measure is zero for random search behaviour2, negative for more 
attribute-wise (horizontal) transitions and positive for more option-wise (vertical) transitions. We 
compute the SM index for each participant (n) and choice task (t). The square root of the absolute value 
of the SM index for each participant (n) and choice task (t) was then modelled in a mixed effects linear 
regression model: 
 
�|SMnt| = β0 + β1TRIALnt + β2TRIALnt2 + β3DSDnt + β4EXPERIMENTnt +ωn + εnt  (4) 
 
                                                          
2 SM does not evaluate the quality of information processing, but only how the information is being visually 
processed. Thus, a “random search” (SM=0) does not necessarily imply poor decision making. 
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Where (ω) measures between-subjects variance, accounting for panel nature of the data. Modelling the 
absolute value of SM index allows investigation into deviations from random information processing 
(i.e., SM = 0). 
 
On the basis of the theory by DeShazo and Fermo (2002) that participants to a CE allocate their limited 
attention in a rationally-adaptive manner, we predict that over the course of the experiment, when 
fatigue sets in, participants’ choices become more random (i.e., the absolute value of SM will reduce). 
For task difficulty, fixation patterns could become more structured (i.e., the absolute value of SM 
increases). The order of the attributes and choice options (EXPERIMENT) may also influence the 
absolute value of SM, but the direction of the effect is more difficult to predict. 
 
For the entire data set, a negative value for SM is obtained in 621 (89.2 %) cases, indicating attribute-
wise (horizontal) information processing. Regression results, shown in Table 3, confirm our predictions. 
The direction of eye movements becomes more random over the course of the experiment (negative 
effect of TRIAL), but more structured for more difficult choices (positive effect of DSD) and more 
structured when COST is presented at the top (positive effect of EXPERIMENT).   
 
5. VISUAL ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOUR 
Finally we examine how transitions (as measured by the SM variable) are linked to choice. Previous 
studies have shown that attribute non-attendance (or more generally attributes attention)  is linked to 
eye movements during the choice (Balcombe et al, 2015; Krucien et al, 2017; Spinks & Mortimer, 
2015). By examining how transitions are linked to choices, we can test the prediction of random regret 
minimisation (RRM) (Chorus et al, 2008; Chorus, 2010; Chorus, 2012; de Bekker-Grob & Chorus, 
2013; Boeri et al, 2013) that multi-attribute information is processed on an attribute basis. In 
comparison, random utility maximisation (RUM) does not impose a particular type of information 
processing. Thus:  
 
Random Utility Maximisation (RUM) 
UTILITYntA = (∑ βkXntAkk )+εntA      (7) 
UTILITYntB = (∑ βkXntBkk )+εntB      (8) P(Ynt=A)=P(UntA>UntB)=P(VntA − VntB>εntB − εntA)    (9) 
DIFFERENCEUTILITYnt = (∑ βk(XntAk − XntBk)k )+εnt    (10) 
 
Random Regret Minimisation (RRM) 
REGRETntA = �∑ ln �1 + exp �βk�XntB(k) − XntA(k)���k �α +εntA   (11) 
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REGRETntB = �∑ ln �1 + exp �βk�XntA(k) − XntB(k)���k �α +εntB   (12) 
 
Where (n) denotes the respondents, (t) the choice tasks, (k) the attributes, and (X) the value of the 
attributes. The (β) parameters represent preferences for attributes. The (ε) errors are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as type I extreme value leading to the multinomial logit 
(MNL) model (McFadden, 1974; Train, 2009). 
 
Because very few opt-out responses were given3, we only consider responses for either choice A or B, 
meaning that the REGRET function (Eq. 11, 12) collapses into the standard UTILITY function (Eq. 7, 
8) when α = 1. We investigate the impact of visual attention on participants’ choices by specifying the 
(α) parameter as a function of the SM index: 
 
α = exp�α1SM+nt + α2SM+nt2 + α3SM−nt + α4SM−nt2 �  (13) 
 
Where (SM+) and (SM-) correspond to the positive and negative portions of the SM index respectively. 
A negative SM (SM-) indicates a tendency to process information on an attribute basis whilst a positive 
SM (SM+) corresponds to a vertical information processing. We expect (α1) to be non-significant (H1: 
α1 = 0), because vertical information processing makes RUM and RRM more alike (α1 ≈ 0 → α ≈ 1). 
We expect (α3) to be significant (H2: α3 ≠ 0) as attribute-wise information processing would be better 
captured by RRM than RUM.  
 
The results are presented in Table 4. The RRM model provides a better account of participants’ choices, 
as indicated by the lower log-likelihood (LL) value (LLRRM = 343.7 vs. LLRUM = 346.1). However this 
improvement does not reach significance at 5% level (LR test: Deviance = 4.88; P = 0.3). As expected 
(SM-) has a significant and negative effect, indicating that when information processing became more 
attribute-wise, the RUM and RRM provide a different account of participants’ choices.  
 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
In the present work, we show that eye-tracking can aid the understanding of information processing 
strategies in multi-attribute choice. Our results have important implications for the design and modelling 
                                                          
3 The initial sample included 58 participants who provided 696 observations. The opt-out option was selected in 
only 48 (6.9 %) cases. For 53 (91.4 %) participants the share of opt-out choices was below 25% (i.e., less than 
three choices). The highest proportion of opt-out choices (i.e., 58.3 %) was attained by two (3.4 %) participants. 
After removing opt-out choices, 648 (93.1 %) observations remained. 
  
13 
 
of CEs, thus improving the validity of resulting policy recommendations. We found a range of visual 
biases that agree with earlier reported choice biases, including a left-to-right, top-to-bottom and first to 
last. Our work suggests that many of these biases originate in the deployment of visual attention during 
a CE. Importantly, these biases indicate that CE data can be substantially improved by randomising the 
order of alternatives, attributes and choice trials.  While pen-and-paper randomisation may be 
complicated (although not impossible on a participant by participant basis), an increased reliance on 
computerized CEs (e.g., presented on a computer tablet or online via a web-browser) will facilitate such 
randomisation.   Our analyses also demonstrate effects of task factors, including whether attributes are 
defined as best or worse, the level of complexity of the choice task, and ordering of attributes. Our data 
also showed that the RRM model outperformed the RUM model in linking eye movements with 
respondents’ choice behaviour, although the exact link between eye movements and choice behaviour 
needs to be established in future research. 
 
Because CEs contain words (besides numerical information), this raises the question to what extent 
factors that influence reading also influence eye movements when completing a CE. For reading, it is 
known that fixation durations are longer for less frequent (familiar) words, less predictable words, and 
for words with multiple meanings (Rayner, 1998). The extent to which these factors influence fixation 
times during CEs is unclear. In comparison to normal text, text in CEs is repeated often, which increases 
the predictability of the words. It is therefore likely that participants do not read all of the words of 
boxes containing longer text (the resolution of the eye tracker used, may not suffice to answer this 
question with sufficient confidence). Furthermore, we included two warm-up trials, which is expected 
to increase predictability further.  In all, we therefore do not expect strong effects of word properties on 
processing a CE. A second possible factor involves reading ability of our participants. While we did not 
test explicitly for this, our participant groups were uniform on a broad range of other factors (all current 
or former students). Moreover, most of the effects tested in our study involved within subjects 
comparisons (the only exception being the EXPERIMENT factor), which are less likely to be influenced 
by individual differences. 
 
There are a few possible limitations to our study. Firstly, the act of eye tracking may influence visual 
attention. This, however, is unlikely to influence the present results. While studies in social attention 
suggest that awareness of the recording of eye movements influences the direction of visual attention 
(Risko & Kingstone, 2011), these results are for objects that are socially less acceptable to be gazed at 
(e.g., a swimsuit calendar on the wall). No eye tracker bias is found for neutral objects.  
 
Second, and perhaps more notable, our eye-tracker used a chin-and-forehead rest. The use of such 
equipment is not uncommon in eye tracking studies, particularly those requiring high spatial accuracy 
of the recordings (as in studies of reading); Rayner, 1978, 1998). The restriction of head movements, 
14 
 
however, may have reduced the frequency of looking away from the text. Examining the effects of head 
restriction would be an interesting venue for future research, particularly now that mobile eye tracking 
technology is becoming more mainstream and more accurate.  
 
Third, our sample, psychology students, was not representative of the UK population. The use of a 
student sample is in line with many studies in consumer research and social psychology (Henry, 2008), 
mostly because they are easier to recruit for lab based studies. There are indications that students may 
not be representative of the general population, as they tend to have stronger cognitive skills and show 
more compliant behaviour (Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Thus, the generalisability of our findings is 
limited. However, while choices may differ for a different population, there are no clear reasons to 
believe that the link between visual attention and choices and visual biases will depend on the 
population studied.  With the development of more portable eye tracking equipment (e.g., EyeTribe, 
Eyelink Portable Duo, SMI Red250 Portable, Tobii X2-60, Tobii 2 Glasses, SMI Glasses, Positive 
Science eye tracker), future research should aim to move the work to a broader population based sample, 
and move from the laboratory into clinical and community settings.  
 
Finally, we note that in our multivariate analysis of fixation times we investigated whether “better” 
attributes attract more attention (and conversely “worse” attribute less attention). While for the 
quantitative attributes (e.g., reduction of risk of hypertension) it is clear what defined “better”, we had 
to base our assumptions regarding best and worst levels on responses to the original CE, generated from 
the general population. Whether these extend to our student population needs to be addressed in future 
research.  
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our study shows how eye tracking provides insight into how respondents complete CEs, suggesting a 
number of biases and context related decision strategies. As well as providing guidance to CE 
practitioners on the design and analysis of CE data, we hope our paper stimulates discussion of the use 
of eye-tracking in applied economic research. As Lahey & Oxley (2016) comment, research with an 
eye tracker is limited only by our imagination.   
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Programme attributes* Level 1                                 [WORST**]
Level 2 
[INTERMEDIATE**]
Level 3 
[INTERMEDIATE**]
Level 4                             
[BEST**] Coding***
Expected 
effect****
Comprehensiveness 
[PROGRAMME]
Partial (Healthy eating OR 
Physical activity OR Healthy 
eating with support for 
management of weight 
changes OR Physical activity 
with support for management 
of weight changes )
- -
Full (Healthy eating and 
physical activity OR 
Healthy eating and 
physical activity with 
support for management 
of weight changes )
Dummy                   
(Ref: Partial)
³  0
Goal [GOAL]
Partial (Feeling better OR 
Looking better)
- -
Full (Looking better and 
feeling better)
Dummy                   
(Ref: Partial)
³  0
Weight reduction 
[WEIGHT]
Stay the same Lose half a stone Lose a stone Lose one and half stone 
Continuous     
(0; 0.5; 1; 1.5)
³  0
Reduction in risk of 
Diabetes [DIABETES]
No reduction 
Reducing risk                 
up to 20% 
Reducing risk                
by 20-40% 
Reducing risk                    
by 40-60% 
Continuous       
(0; 20; 40; 60)
³  0
Reduction in risk of high 
blood pressure [HBP]
No reduction 
Reducing risk                 
up to 25% 
Reducing risk                 
by 25-50% 
Reducing risk                     
by 50-75% 
Continuous     
(0; 25; 50; 75)
³  0
Time per day [TIME] 120 min/day 90 min/day 60 min/day 30 min/day 
Continuous      
(30; 60; 90; 120)
£ 0
Cost per week [COST] £20/week £10/week £5/week £1/week 
Continuous        
(1; 5; 10; 20)
£ 0
*** CODING indicates how the attributes were included in the modelling of participants' choices
Table 1. Attributes and levels used to define the health and lifestyle (H&L) programmes
* Attributes are listed by order of appearance in the choice options (i.e., PROGRAMME was located at the top of the options)
** WORST/INTERMEDIATE/BEST indicate whether the attribute level was set at its worst/intermediate/best theoretical value (given expected preferences)
**** EXPECTED EFFECT refers to the average preferences for the attribute
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MLE SE P
Constant 6.204 0.063 < 0.001
LEFT 0.146 0.015 < 0.001
POSITION (Top) 0.259 0.018 < 0.001
POSITION (Bottom) -0.170 0.019 < 0.001
LEVEL (Best) 0.090 0.021 < 0.001
LEVEL (Worst) -0.037 0.017 0.026
TRIAL -0.039 0.009 < 0.001
TRIAL x TRIAL 0.002 0.001 < 0.001
DIFFICULTY (DSD) 0.336 0.091 < 0.001
EXPERIMENT 0.182 0.071 0.010
Individual errors 0.264 - -
Observation errors 0.680 - -
# Observations
# Parameters
Log-likelihood
MLE: Maximum Likelihood Estimate; SE: Standard Error;          
P: P-value; DSD = Dispersion of standard deviation
Table 2. Mixed effects regression of ln(fixation times)
1. Model parameters
2. Model statistics
8,421
11
8,816.8
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MLE SE P
Constant 1.501 0.089 < 0.001
TRIAL -0.038 0.017 0.026
TRIAL x TRIAL 0.001 0.001 0.652
DIFFICULTY (DSD) 0.020 0.165 0.905
EXPERIMENT 0.381 0.093 < 0.001
Individual error 0.338 - -
Observation error 0.356 - -
# Observations
# Parameters
Log-likelihood
MLE: Maximum Likelihood Estimate; SE: Standard Error; P: P-value
696
6
352.3
Table 3. Mixed effects regression of SM index
1. Model parameters
2. Model statistics
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MLE SE P MLE SE P
PROGRAMME 0.624 0.234 0.008 0.606 0.232 0.009
GOAL 0.885 0.183 < 0.001 0.891 0.181 < 0.001
WEIGHT 0.490 0.155 0.002 0.526 0.156 < 0.001
DIABETES 0.024 0.004 < 0.001 0.024 0.004 < 0.001
HBP 0.011 0.003 < 0.001 0.011 0.003 < 0.001
TIME -0.015 0.002 < 0.001 -0.015 0.002 < 0.001
COST -0.029 0.011 0.009 -0.028 0.011 0.011
Regret (α1) - - - 0.360 0.331 0.277
Regret (α2) - - - -0.115 0.190 0.547
Regret (α3) - - - -0.135 0.069 0.049
Regret (α4) - - - -0.016 0.011 0.129
# Observations
# Parameters
Log-likelihood
MLE: Maximum Likelihood Estimate; SE: Standard Error; P: P-value
648 648
7 11
346.1 343.7
2. Model statistics
Table 4. MNL modelling of discrete choices with RUM and RRM approaches
RUM RRM
1. Model parameters
24 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the choice tasks and regions of interest (ROI) mapping* 
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Figure 2. Evolution of information processing strategies (IPS) over (fixation) time 
 
 
